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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTEBLY
as inviolable as possible, and that a precedent is created that would
seem to lead to a letting down of the bars so that marriage may
subserve business ends or afford amusement rather than the pur-
pose intended for it by divine and common law.
Perhaps in this particular instance the best interests of all in-
volved will be subserved by the decision of the court. But such
decision must of necessity have a demoralizing effect upon the
young people of today. It must lessen their respect for mar-
riage and cause them lightly to enter into marriage, thinking that
if they find such relation disagreeable they can have it annulled.
In answer to this it might be said that where there has been no
cohabitation the relation has not changed. But the matter of
proving cohabitation is met with difficulty when both parties
deny it.
The English courts grant annulment only if there is no reality
of consent and if there is consent, no fraud inducing that consent
is material. Germany, Switzerland, and some of the other Euro-
pean countries seem to take a much more liberal view and grant
annulment on ground of mistake in nationality or in personal
qualities and characteristics." It is not contended that the extreme
view of the English courts should be adopted, and surely, the most
liberal ones are not advisable. It would seem that the view of most
of the American courts, viz., granting annulment on the ground
of mistake, fraud, duress or some incapacity to contract, is the
wisest view.' 2 But it should not be extended.
It is not to be argued that parties unsuited to each other should
be made to live together as husband and wife. But should people
lightly enter into an illadvised marriage it would not be an un-
common or extreme punishment to require them to wait the stat-
utory period for desertion-say, three years-to get a divorce. The
same end would be accomplished, the parties to the transaction
would have paid for their offense to society, and better example
would be set for others, for people will not be prone to thought-
lessly rush into a situation that it will take three years to change.
-R. G. K.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE-NATURE OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT-
SUFFICIENCY.-The proceeding by notice of motion for judgment
under Chapter 121 of the West Virginia Code is being used more
and more frequently by practitioners in this state. The reason
21 Moss v. Moss (1897) P. 263.
2 26 CYc 901.
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for this is found in the simplicity of the proceeding, and the utter
absence of the technical requirements incident to pleading at com-
man law. Virginia, also, has a similar statute which, although
made broader in its scope by recent amendments, is coincident
with the West Virginia proceeding in its general principles.1
The notice takes the place of both writ and declaration and is
served on the defendant in the same manner as process.2  Service
must be made twenty days before and the return fifteen days
before the motion is heard.3 The notice is not an official paper
until it is returned to the clerk's office. 4 Hence the action aoes
not start until the return has been made and the notice filed with
the clerk.
The remedy under a proceeding by notice of motion for judg-
ment in West Virginia is restricted to the recovery of money due
on contract." The plaintiff then may use this proceeding only
where he is entitled to recover money by action on contract. It
may not be used to recover damages for a breach of contract, nor
as a substitute for any action sounding in damages s
In order to be sufficient a notice of motion for judgment should
properly fulfill its office as notice to the defendant, and also set
out the claim on which the defendant is proceeding.' How partic-
ular a statement of the plaintiff's claim then is necessary? The
essential idea behind this proceeding is that it provides a speedy
and simple method of recovering money due on contract. Thus
it has been made informal in its nature and devoid of technical-
ity. The West Virginia Supreme Court and the like Virginia
tribunal have stated many times that great latitude and liberality
shall be given in construing the sufficiency of a notice of motion for
judgment.8 However, regardless of this leaning towards a liberal
construction, the Virginia court has held that to be sufficient the
notice must state a cause of action.9 Our own court also definitely
I VA. CODE 1919, c. 251, § 6046, extends the right to proceed by notice of motion
for judgment to any action at law, instead of restricting its use to actions to recover
money due on contract.2 Security Loan & Trust Co. v. Fields. 110 Va. 827, 67 S. E. 342 (1919) ; Mor-
stock Insurance Co. v. Pankey, 91 Va. 259, 21 S. E. 487 (1895) ; Hastings v. Gump.
89 W. Va. 111, (1921).
3 W. VA. CODE, 1916, c. 121, § 6. Knox v. Homer, 58 W. Va. 136, 51 S. E. 979
(1905).
BURK'S PLEADING AND PRACTICE, § 06.
W. VA. CODE, 1916, c. 121, § 6. Anderson v. Prince, 60 W. Va. 557, 55 S. E.
656 (1906) ; Wilson v. Dawson, 96 Va. 687, 32 S. E. 461 (1899) ; Long v. Pence,
93 Va. 584, 25 S. E. 593 (1896).6 Wilson v. Dawson, supra; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Bright, 90 Va. 778,
20 S. E. 146 (1894).
I Security Loan & Trust Co. v. Fields, supra.
1 Liskey v. Paul, 100 Va. 764, 42 S. E. 875 (1902) ; Knox v. Horner, supra;
Board of Education v. Parsons, 22 W. Va. 308 (1883).) Security Loan & Trust Co. v. Fields, supra.
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took this position in a recent case.10 Is this holding consistent
with previous decisions in this state? While the exact point had
not been definitely passed on previously so as to leave it without
doubt, yet other decisions have at least intimated that the notice
to be sufficient must state a cause of action."- While this is a step
away from liberal construction yet it is a necessary one. If no
standard were set as to what constituted a sufficient statement of
the plaintiff's claim as set out in a notice of motion for judgenent,
endless confusion and disagreement would result, and the utility of
this proceeding would be sadly injured. If a standard were to be
set it is only logical to require the notice to state a cause of action.
To require more would be useless and of no value; to require less
would be to endanger the-right of the defendant to a clear state-
ment of the claim against him in order that he may intelligently
prepare to defend. Thus the West Virginia court seems to be
-correct in requiring a notice of motion for judgment to state a
cause of action in order to be sufficient. 2  R. J. R.
CRIMINAL LAW-INTOXICATING LIQUORS-EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT
TO SUSTAIN VERDICT.-Defendants were convicted of transporta-
tion of more than one quart of intoxicating liquors in violation
of section 31 of chapter 32A of the Code. The defendants about
to be arrested broke three half gallon jars which had contained
an unknown amount of whiskey. One witness testified that from
the appearance where it was spilled on the ground that there was
about a gallon in two of the jars. The defendants did not testify.
There was a motion to set aside the verdict on the ground, inter
alia, that there was not sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict
that the transportation was of more than one quart. Held, that
there was sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction; that the
facts proven in this case, unexplained, were sufficient to justify
the jury's verdict. State v. Hussion, 112 S. E. 309 (W. Va. 1922).
This is the first ase of this character to come before the West
Virginia court for decision. It would seem that this decision is
sound upon principle. The test in determining whether a verdict
should be sustained or reveresd because of insufficiency of evi-
dence is whether or not the jury could reasonably have found such
a verdict. It is not enough that the members of the appellate court
think that if they had been on the jury they might have found a
10 Hastings v. Gump, supra.
u Anderson -v. Prince, supra.
v Hastings v. Gump, supra.
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